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ABSTRACT
Capabilities-based networks present a fundamental shift in
the security design of network architectures. Instead of
permitting the transmission of packets from any source to
any destination, routers deny forwarding by default. For a
successful transmission, packets need to positively identify
themselves and their permissions to the router. The analysis
of the data path credentials data structure that we propose
shows that as few as 128 bits are sufficient to reduce the
probability of unauthorized traffic reaching its destination
to a fraction of a percent.
General Terms
Design, Security
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.1 [Computer-Communication Networks]: Gen-
eral—Security and protection
1. NETWORKS WITH CAPABILITIES
Recent proposals for capabilities-based networks have sug-
gested a fundamental shift in the design philosophy of the
Internet by moving from an “on-by-default” to an “off-by-
default” assumption. The initial idea has been introduced
by Anderson et al. [1] in the context of DoS attacks and fur-
ther explored by Ballani et al. [2] for other attacks. In such
a network, a connection needs to be explicitly authorized to
reach an end-system rather than being allowed to connect
to an end-system by default. Authorization is based on ca-
pabilities, which are tokens that represent authority for a
particular operation. During the connection setup and data
transfer, a connection’s capabilities are validated along the
connection path.
We present a capabilities-based network architecture with
a novel design of capabilities, which we call “data path cre-
dentials.” In particular, these credentials can be validated
easily in the data path of routers and thus allow high-
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performance implementations. Therefore, we can check ca-
pabilities on every hop along the path and provide effective
defenses against a range of attacks. In our prior work, we
have introduced the general architecture of this network de-
sign [3] as well as initial ideas on how to design data path
credentials [4]. A major challenge for a high-performance
implementation of such a network is an efficient design of
the credentials that are carried in the packet and the ver-
ification procedure on the router. We present a data path
credentials data structure that is based on Bloom filters.
The credentials are fixed length (independent of the number
of routers that are traversed by the packet) and can be ver-
ified by routers with a few simple operations. Our analysis
shows that credentials as small as 128 bits can effectively
reduce the probability of unauthorized traffic reaching its
destination to a fraction of a percent.
2. DATA PATH CREDENTIALS DESIGN
The data path credentials data structure that is used to
carry packet permissions is based on Bloom filters. A Bloom
filter is a bit array that can store m bits. Using k different
hash functions h1(x) . . . hk(x), an element x is mapped to k
bit position in the array. When adding element x, the bits
corresponding to the hash function values for element x are
set to 1. When performing a check for membership of an
element, the hash functions for the element are computed
and it is checked if the according bits in the array are set.
Only if all of these bits are set to 1, the element is reported
to be a member of the set.
To use the Bloom filter data structure as data path cre-
dentials for packets that traverse the network, we store cre-
dentials from each router along the path. The source node of
a connection negotiates permission to transmit data across
a router during connection setup. When router j (1≤j≤n)
permits transmission, it provides the source with its router
credentials rj . Router credentials are the set of indices rj [i]
(1≤i≤k) of bits that are set in the Bloom filter array. The
credentials from all routers along the path are then super-
imposed (i.e., logical OR operation) in the Bloom filter data
structure. This creates aggregate credentials c (consisting
of a single bit array of size m) that are sent with each data
packet (see Figure 1). When receiving a packet with ag-
gregate credentials c, router j can then check the value of
all bits that were provided in router credentials rj . If the
aggregate credentials are valid, then
∏
i c[rj [i]] = 1, where
the product is the equivalent of a logical AND operation. If
the aggregate credentials do not contain the router creden-
tials of a particular router, it is likely that one of the bits in
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(b) Probability of Successful Attack
Transmission.
Figure 2: Evaluation of Data Path Credentials (size m=128, number
of hash functions k=4).
credentials c does not contain a 1 at one of the router cre-
dentials’ bit positions. Thus the validation of the aggregate
credentials fails.
The security of the network architecture depends on the
security of the credentials. We can achieve this by using
cryptographically strong hash functions (e.g., MD5 or SHA-
1) where router j uses k secret keys sj [i], 1 ≤ i ≤ k. The
cryptographic hash function hi(sj [i], f) uses router j’s key
for bit index k to determine which bits to set in the aggre-
gate credentials. It is important that this function also uses
flow identifier f (e.g., based on a 5-tuple hash) as an input to
avoid attacks where credentials from an authenticated con-
nection are used by a different connection. In order to make
data path credentials immune to a simple attack, where all
bits in the data path credentials are simply set to 1, we intro-
duce a“density”metric d(c) that reflects the number of 1’s in




To consider credentials valid, we require that the density is
equal or below a certain threshold: d(c) ≤ dmax.
3. SECURITY ANALYSIS
Since a Bloom filter can yield false positives, it is possible
that traffic with forged credentials may pass through the net-
work. In a unicast scenario, attack traffic needs to traverse
n hops from source to destination and pass credential checks
on each hop. When validating credentials, a router checks if
all k bits of its credentials are set. To reach the destination,
all bits set (in valid credentials) are checked at least once.
Thus, an attacker has to be able to create forged creden-
tials with at least those bits set. The number of bits set,
b(m, k, n), in a Bloom filter of size m with k hash functions
and n stored items is b(m, k, n) = m ·
(




false positive transmission (i.e., a successful attack) occurs
when among the bits set by the attacker (limited by dmax),
there is the correct set of b(m, k, n) bits that is checked by
the set of routers along the path. The probability for this
event is funicast(m, k, h) = (dmax)
b(m,k,h) .
Similarly, the false positive transmission probability
for multicast/multipath is fmulticast(m, k, h) = 1 −
(1 − funicast(m, k, h))2h (assuming a binary multicast tree
of height h). For network coding, where multiple packets
are necessary to reconstruct the original transmissions, the
probability is fnetwork coding(m, k, h) =
(fmulticast(m, k, h − 1) · funicast(m, k, 1))2
(h−1)
.
Figure 2(a) shows the number of bits set (as determined
by b(m, k, n)) for credentials of size 128 bits and four hash
functions. As the path length increases, the number of bits
set by credentials also increases. For multicast and network
coding, the increase is much steeper than for unicast since
many more credentials are aggregated due to the larger num-
ber of paths and destinations. When the maximum density
(in this example dmax = 0.75) is exceeded, credentials are
rejected by all routers. The false positive rates that corre-
spond to this example are shown in Figure 2(b). Data points
are only shown for those cases where the maximum density
is not exceeded (the dotted lines continue beyond this limit
to illustrate the overall trends). The decreasing trend with
an increasing number of hops is due to repeated credential
checks. The results show that adding credentials with as few
as 128 bits to packets can reduce the probability that attack
traffic can reach its destination to a fraction of a percent.
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